Royal Navy Classified Submarine Missions of the Cold War

(Originally published at https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2024/05/royal-navy-classified-submarine.html where table formatting is correctly aligned)

The National Archives in Kew is one of the world’s great repositories of information. Acting as the official archive for the British Government, its vast shelves and, literally miles, of storage containing information that in its day was often classified as TOP SECRET, but today is available for any member of the public to read. Kew is somewhere well worth a visit because it gives a chance to see papers handled by great political and military figures and hold them in your own hands, reading the files that tell the stories of how decisions were reached and policies enacted. It is also a chance too to see ‘behind the curtain’ and compare the official correspondence and ‘lines to take’ with the private and often highly indiscrete thoughts of officials and officers alike.

Not all files make it to the archives. Historically the British Government has only chosen to preserve files of historic value, rather than every file, noting that there is finite storage space and capacity to preserve the records. Under the formerly 30 year rule, and now 20 year rule, files should be reviewed for a decision on their future at a point when they should be transferred to the archives. Not every file makes it to the Archives — some are destroyed by their parent department, while others are retained using various legal instruments to keep them closed. The reasons for this may include protection of sensitive information, intelligence or operations that are so sensitive, revealing them may compromise wider national security (this is sometimes referred to as a ‘retained file’ in the sense that the file remains with its parent Department and is not sent to the Archives).

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What this means is that what is seen in the Archives online record system (known as ‘Discovery’) is a huge list of tantalising files, some of which are open to read or download, while many more are retained by their departments, usually for many decades. A cursory glance at Discovery shows file after file on nuclear weapons, deterrence policy, nuclear targeting, Special Forces operations and a myriad of other highly secret and sensitive files that will almost certainly never be open to the public to see. Central among these files are those records which relate to Submarine operations by the Royal Navy, which are starting to appear in the archives records as ‘retained files’. What is fascinating is the way that these files hint at all manner of fascinating activities.

Humphrey is a regular user of the National Archives, and tries to visit when personal circumstances permit, usually with a lengthy reading list of subjects to research. Recently he noticed by chance reference to various submarine operations, and realised that they were being conducted on behalf of naval intelligence. Always keen to dig deeper, many hours of detective work later and the result was a complete list of all the files declared to the Archives relating to naval intelligence missions that had been conducted by Royal Navy submarines during the 1970s to 1990s. This blog is a slightly unusual PSL blog in that it analyses this data and offers some narrative and suggestions on other avenues of research.

There are some important constraints in this article. Firstly, this research is based purely on those files declared to the National Archives that the MOD has chosen to retain on national security grounds. It is at best a tiny snapshot of a much bigger operational picture that has likely been lost to time. It is likely that many of the missions conducted will have been in files that were shredded and not declared to Kew, and that there is no one master document listing all of them that will be publicly viewable.

Secondly the timelines are very narrow — there is no mention of documents relating to submarine operations in the 1960s — this does not mean that they did not happen, but that either the filing systems have changed, or that the keywords are different. More work is required to find them lurking in the Discovery database. This article is, at best, a reflection of a finite time period.

Finally, this article is based entirely on open-source guesswork. Although the author has previously worked for the MOD, he has never worked in any aspect of this highly secretive world and has precisely zero professional knowledge about the subjects being discussed here. It is entirely possible that what follows could be completely wrong — any mistakes made are the authors alone. There is no classified information in anything written in this blog and it could be utter nonsense!

Summary:

There are approximately 130 files declared to the National Archives in Kew which relate to submarine intelligence gathering operations conducted between 1980 and 1995 by the force of OBERON, UPHOLDER, VALIANT, CHURCHILL, SWIFTSURE and TRAFALGAR class submarines. No files could be found for HMS DREADNOUGHT or the PORPOISE class, although this does not mean they were not used in this role — rather the files are well hidden! There is a patrol report available for download covering monitoring of terrorist in Northern Ireland by HMS CAHCALOT in the 1970s known as OP AWLESS — ironically other files on the same op are retained). No analysis has been done on activities of the post war ‘A’ Class or the wartime era T class boats, although these were known to be active in the intelligence space .

The breakdown of reported operations by class is as follows:

Class

Total Files Declared to TNA Kew

OBERON

24 named operations

3 named missions

10 patrol reports

UPHOLDER

1 named operation

VALIANT

5 named operations

3 patrol reports

CHURCHILL

10 named operations

6 patrol reports

SWIFTSURE

15 named operations

8 named missions

3 patrol reports

TRAFALGAR

32 named operations

1 named mission

1 patrol report

TOTAL

87 named operations

12 named missions

23 patrol reports

In collating this, the author has drawn the following distinction between the three types of files.

‘Named Operations’: A file referring to an Operation name (e.g. OP IOWA) that was attributed to that specific vessel (e.g. the file would be called ‘HMS TRIUMPH OP IOWA’).

‘Named Missions’: A file referring to a mission name / serial number that was attributed to a specific vessel (e.g. ‘HMS SUPERB Mission B.79’). The files refer to missions under the ‘B, E and FP’ headers.

‘Patrol Reports’: A file referring to a specific deployment or patrol that was assigned to a named submarine (e.g. ‘HMS SOVEREIGN, Operations in North Norwegian Sea’).

There is almost certainly some overlap between these files — for example some of the mission names are also likely covering parts of the Operation, although the dates do not necessarily always add up. Without viewing the files though, it is not possible to determine how interlinked they are, or if they are stand alone missions.

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How to spot a file of interest

The power of the Discovery website is that it enables some very effective keyword searching, allowing you to quickly filter files by subject, department and closure status, helping identify subjects of interest. When you click on a record it will tell you the title and any prior file reference used — a powerful tool when departmental reorganisations will have resulted in changes of filing structures.

In the case of these files, keyword searches were made using each submarines name, then reviewing the files that came up. Many were self-explanatory titles, while others were anodyne but still retained. What was particularly helpful was looking for files carrying prior file references — under the system uploaded onto the archives, many of the Royal Navy files of interest are classed as DEFE69 (Flag Officer Submarines). This in turn was often a file previously classed as a DS5, or DI8 or DI(NC) file, all of which link the file to intelligence (DI is a well-known acronym for Defence Intelligence, NC for Naval Collection). What this means is over time it is possible to build up a good understanding of what operations were linked to Defence Intelligence work, and usually which platform carried them out. Currently there are 634 files retained within the DEFE69 series that will not be opened to the public.

To further corroborate this, other files can occasionally provide valuable corroboration — a search for operation names, usually hunting for ‘retained’ files will provide some useful clues. The DEFE67 series is linked to ASW training schools and contains many Operational Reports from this period — all of which are closed. However the title of some of the reports (e.g. ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare analysis report’ gives an insight into the type of operation that was carried out. Several operations credited to submarines can be corroborated this way by looking at the report type.

The DEFE67 files are particularly valuable as a reference point as they were created by the so-called ‘MOD Operational Evaluation Group and Submarine Tactics / Weapons Group and Joint Anti Submarine School’ — This was the fleet evaluation group that conducted operational analysis on operations, weapons and tactics. The modern equivalent of this group is a combination of the Maritime Warfare Centre and what became the Joint Maritime Operational Training Staff (JMOTS) based at Northwood for many years. The role of this group was to conduct operational analysis, and there is a long list of Operations that they provided both doctrinal analysis on, as well as an assessment of ASW tactics. Whatever was happening, it was clear that the submarines were deploying to places with sufficient rigour that a post operational evaluation by the naval experts in weapons and tactics was called for.

At least 33 named operations have had post operational analysis conducted by this group, including at least six Fleet ASW Analysis reports, 14 Fleet Operational Analysis reports and 13 Joint Acoustic ASW Centre Analysis reports. All of the files located so far are related to operations in the 1980s and 1990s. Only a small number of these operations have been linked to RN submarine operations referred to in the National Archives. The dates and timing of these reports indicates that the RN was heavily involved in ASW operations throughout the 80s and 90s, although it is not clear whether this relates to RN submarine deployments, or surface ship deployments or operations against other submarines. For example Op DISSECTION occurred in January 1992 — a Joint ASW and Acoustic Centre report involving HMS CLEOPATRA, a LEANDER class frigate. We know that CLEOPATRA was a platform modified for specialist SIGINT collection, publicly confirmed by this file about SIGINT Collection Operations in 1978. A review of that file has confirmed that she embarked a number of SIGINT specialists for collection missions in the Med and throughout the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region. It is possible that she was used in a similar manner for Op DISSECTION, although this cannot be confirmed. What this means though is its hard to confirm whether these operations were primarily about submarines or if they involved Royal Navy ASW forces tracking Soviet vessels.

Another way of confirming activity is to look at other Departments, many of which will release material to different standards. Ironically No10 Downing Street can occasionally release files linked to the Prime Minister in this way — there is a short file (CAB 301–761) about an intelligence gathering mission conducted by HMS COURAGEOUS in the Eastern Med in 1976 (Op name currently unknown). In the wider letter, and more importantly the draft letters not sent, it is revealed that the RN planned to conduct intelligence collection during a visit to Odessa in 1976, and that the Soviet vessel visiting Portsmouth in 1976 would be subject to no less than seven different intelligence collection operations.

This is where OSINT really comes into play — after googling and using the Navy News archive, it was possible to confirm that HMS DEVONSHIRE visited Odessa, while a Soviet cruiser, Ozvbratzovy visited Portsmouth (the first visit to the UK in 20 years by a Soviet warship). The end result from a scribbled draft note buried in the No10 Archive files is a gold mine to look at how naval intelligence was conducted during this time. Ironically amid all of this, the actual dates and details of the operation COURAGEOUS was conducting have been lost.

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Deployment Analysis

Looking at the information available, it is possible to draw some analysis on key deployment areas. Unsurprisingly during the Cold War the most important area for deployments seems to have been into northern waters.

File names indicate at least seven missions occurred in the areas of the Norwegian / Barents / Iceland /Faroes waters during this time. Several of them were called ‘surveillance missions’ suggesting that the purpose of the trip was to collect intelligence from Soviet vessels/systems. The Greenland/Norwegian/Barents sea is a vast area of water that would in wartime probably have been full of Soviet attack submarines and potentially some of their ballistic missile submarines too.

We know that there was a significant submarine detection presence through submarines, surface ships and maritime patrol aircraft, supported by the SOSUS sonar network. It is likely that these missions would have used wider intelligence to enable the boat to get close to a target of interest.

It is also likely, based on the range of the Polaris missiles that this area may have been a patrol area for Royal Navy and US Navy SSBNs, to ensure they were close enough to fire in wartime. The same is likely to be true of Soviet submarines, and there may well have been a wide range of targets of interest from an intelligence perspective.

The second area of significant attention was the Mediterranean, a key area of strategic concern to the UK for centuries. In the 1960s files indicate that the RN deployed at least one OBERON class submarine (HMS OCELOT) to conduct intelligence collection operations against Soviet vessels of interest (the full account of this operation will be written up in a separate future Pinstripedline blog).

We know from the files that the Med was a particularly valued location for underwater photography due to its unique environmental conditions. A note on the operation helps justify the intelligence collection value as:

“The clearness of the water and the bright conditions above the surface afford an opportunity to obtain some unique intelligence. Soviet security is such that Western intelligence seldom obtains a view of important modern ships in dock and therefore all too little is known about the important underwater configuration and fittings of such ships. These are very important items — hull configuration, particularly allied with the shape and numbers of propellor blades is an important factor in assessing speed/endurance, turning circles, radiated noise and, in the case of submarines, diving depth. Sizes and shape of sonar domes provide evidence of the power and frequency used and hence the capability of the sonar set itself. If OCELOT could pass underneath (or nearly so) she would have a very good chance of obtaining unique intelligence badly needed not just by ourselves, but by the Americans.”

There was a clearly defined British government policy in place for such operations. We know from the files that it was reviewed in 1968, and was called ‘JIC 68/5’, which set out both the policy constraints for different types of collection missions (e.g. conducted in international waters or inside foreign territorial waters), and that the risk level of different missions required approval at different ministerial levels. Reference is made in files to the sort of operations being conducted by OCELOT as an ‘Op LIBEL’ indicating a non-contentious / low risk intelligence operation, which could be approved by a junior minister (at this time the Under Secretary of State for the Royal Navy). Higher risk operations would need approval at either Secretary of State or even Prime Ministerial level.

It is likely that the Royal Navy conducted multiple intelligence gathering patrols in the Med throughout the 1970s — 1990s. HMS ODIN and ORPHEOUS are known to have carried out these patrols in the mid 1980s, while HMS COURAGEOUS deployed in the 1970s, HMS WARSPITE in the 1980s and SPLENDID carried out a ‘surveillance operation’ in the Med in January 1986. It is reasonable to assume that these would have included both SIGINT collection and potentially underwater photography and were conducted on at least an annual basis (files relating to the OCELOT mission indicated that the RN planned to conduct at least one SSK deployment per year in the Med for these purposes). The last known (to date) intelligence deployments to the Med appeared to have occurred in 1994 when HMS TIRELESS and TALENT deployed separately on Op SHARPGUARD, the multi-year NATO / EU blockade of the Adriatic during the Balkans civil wars.

One well known public deployment that was likely to have been related to the Med was that of HMS SUPERB, who in April 1982 was observed sailing from Gibraltar just after the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands. In fact SUPERB was not involved in the Falklands War, but was operationally committed throughout April, taking part in ‘OP SARDIUS’, which is likely to have been an intelligence collection mission. Interestingly she was also committed to DIS related tasking later in the year under mission ‘E79’ in Oct — Dec 82, with there being some suggestion that the ‘E’ series missions were SIGINT related. Of note, there are two files called ‘Submarine Patrol Investigation of Soviet ASW Tactics’ for the period 01 May — 01 Sep 1982, that were produced by the DIS. It is possible (but not confirmed) that HMS SUPERB was engaged during OP SARDIUS on either intelligence collection in the Med, or trying to ‘poke the bear’ and see how they conducted ASW operations. It is only possible to produce a report on an investigation of Soviet ASW tactics if you’ve actually got first hand evidence on how the Soviets conducted themselves. It is reasonable to assume that either SUPERB or another RN Boat were very busy and up close with the Soviets throughout the spring of 1982.

The events of 1982 opened the door to a third focus for RN submarine deployments, namely off the coast of Argentina. After the war concluded, there was a new commitment to sustain at least two submarines (usually SSNs) in the region, which later dropped over time to an occasional presence roughly 20–30% of the time by the mid-1990s. Files indicate that during the period of late 1982–1983, the UK had credible intelligence based concerns that the Argentines may mount a renewed threat on the islands. This led to the deployment initially of HMS VALIANT and WARSPITE, with HMS OSIRIS also deploying to cover an SSN gap when WARSPITE was delayed arriving in theatre. We know from publicly available files that throughout 1983 HMS OSIRIS conducted intelligence collection patrols off the coast of Argentina, tracking Argentine warships, and working with HMS VALIANT to map the Argentine coast, activities of their warships and air force and build a deeper understanding of the region. It is likely that throughout this period the Argentines were blissfully unaware that in their main naval exercise areas, at least one, and occasionally two British submarines were monitoring their every move. A separate Pinstripedline blog will be written in due course about the patrol of HMS OSIRIS and her encounters with the Argentine Navy.

In total though, the files indicate that in the 1980s, at least seven, and likely a significantly higher number, of patrols were conducted by the submarines ONSLAUGHT, ORPHEOUS, OSIRIS, VALIANT, WARSPITE, CHURCHILL and COURAGEOUS. This conventional and nuclear presence was maintained at a near 100% level of cover until the late 1980s. By 1991 the official requirement had reduced to 42% cover, driven mainly by an SSK presence with an SSN held at 14 days readiness, which due to the challenges faced by RN reactor issues and reduced submarine hulls it was found to be very difficult to sustain. Indeed by 1991 the RN had to make Ministers aware that if they continued to focus on the delivery of Falklands patrols by SSN’s and SSK’s then:

“Because of the reduction in SSN availability due to the continuing trouserlegs problem and the early run down of submarine numbers due to Options, there are increasingly serious difficulties in maintaining the 42% commitment. In short due to the reduced size of the SSK fleet, it will no longer be possible to plan on deploying SSKs to the South Atlantic after the end of this year. To meet the requirement with SSNs would account for a disproportionate amount of all SSN availability; there would be a serious impact on operational effectiveness, training (including a further setback to Trident requirements), NATO, national exercises and commitments’

Instead by the early 1990s the RN gained ministerial approval to only conduct ‘periodic’ deployments to the region using an SSN for between 15–25% of the time. These later deployments in the early 1990s are particularly interesting as they required the submarines to be visible in a way that they were not intended. To maximise deterrent value, Ministers approved the planning of a programme which ensured:

“that submarine patrols include provision for appropriate planned sighting opportunities so as to maximise their deterrent value. While the operating instructions require the submarines to conduct covert operations, much of the Falklands patrols is overt; for example, surfaced movements, exercises and occasional port visits. Overt activities would include as a high priority in future patrols.”

As noted above, by the late 1980s one of the biggest challenges facing the RN submarine force was that of operational availability of hulls. In 1989 a major crack was discovered in the steam generator pipe of HMS WARSPITE, then under refit. In a note to the Prime Minister in 1990 it was observed that this fault, known as the ‘trouserleg’ due to its welding and seam location on the piping. It was noted that:

“This discovery undermined confidence in similar welds in all other RN nuclear submarines… Failure of this weld could, in the worst case, result in reactor damage and consequential radiological hazard… This analysis was of such sufficient concern that in January this year the Safety and Reliability Directorate (SRD) of the UK Atomic Energy Authority, MODs independent safety assessors issued a SAFETY REQUIREMENT that ‘operation of the nuclear submarine flotilla should cease until an adequate safety justification has been formulated.

In other words, at the near end of the Cold War, the MOD warned the Prime Minister that it had a reasonably held belief that every single one of its then roughly 20 strong nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines was at risk of reactor damage and radiological hazards causing the security of the entire force into question and that the entire force needed to cease operations. This would mean the loss of the SSN force to NATO operations as well as the breaking of the continuous at sea deterrent while the problem was fixed. Instead, the solution was that where suitable safety precautions were in place, operations could continue but on a strictly case by case basis. This meant that at the end of the Cold War, large numbers of the older RN submarine force were unable to operate, and several of the older hulls were paid off early. This points to the real challenges faced by the submarine force during this period, and which indicates why some submarines were paid off early.

Crown CopyrightWhat Is Bigger Picture?

Why does all of this continue to matter today? Simply put, times have not changed! The UK continues to enjoy a similar level of strategic concerns against Russia, security in the Med and residual concerns in the South Atlantic. It is trying to do this with a nuclear attack submarine force that is smaller now than at any stage during the Cold War, and which is extremely busy.

By looking at how busy the fleet was, where it operated and what it got up to, we are left with a sense of the challenges faced by submariners and the sheer raw courage required to conduct what, at times, appear to have been extremely risky and dangerous operations, far from home or help. These files matter as they provide a snapshot of how busy the force was during the Cold War, how important the role of submarines are to intelligence collection and in monitoring potential threats, and in being able to respond quickly to new challenges. None of these facts have changed today.

None of the files identified here will ever realistically be released to the public, nor is it likely to think that the stories within them be told. At best what we can do is look at the file titles and try to collate a public version of a very classified private world to understand how committed Royal Navy Submarine Service was during the later Cold War years.

The Mission List

Listed below are all the missions conducted by the Royal Navy submarine service between 1980 and 1994 for which operational records can be found on file titles in the National Archives. The table sets out by year the missions conducted by each submarine. Unless otherwise stated all these missions were conducted, at least in part, to carry out some form of intelligence collection. Where a post mission analysis report has been raised, this has been noted too. In addition, the ‘other operations’ column shows operations where acoustic / ASW analysis has been carried out after the mission, but where no the participating units are not known.

There are two tables to review. The first is a chronological table, the second is one broken down by all submarines for whom records could be found, listing the operation and its relevant file reference in the TNA records system.

Some caveats -firstly, these dates are based on the dates in the Archives and may not be precisely accurate for the operation itself (e.g they may relate to activity in another year entirely). Secondly this is not a complete listing, only the listing of the files declared to the National Archives at Kew. There are likely to have been many more missions for which no file has yet been identified or retained. For example, the CO of HMS TIRELESS briefed on a mission to the Prime Minister in 1991, that does not appear to align with any dates found in the archives.

Of note is the fact that ‘trouserleg’ problem appears to have had a significant impact on all RN nuclear operations in 1990 and 1991, with the focus on deployments shifting from older hulls to the newest of the TRAFALGAR class while the safety case was resolved. This is borne out by open source information from the early 1990s which reveals that the entire ‘C’ class were taken out of commission in the early 1990s, removing all these boats from service, while no less than three non-refitting S boats were alongside for most of 1991/92. This would reflect the direction that only the most urgent tasks were carried out by the submarine service during this period.

By 1993 the problem seems to have been recovered due to the paying off of older hulls, and the arrival in service of newer ‘T’ Boats. Of note during this period was the sole operational use of an UPHOLDER, with HMS UNICORN conducting intelligence missions during her single deployment under the White Ensign. Another operation of note was OP IOWA, which involved two different TRAFALGAR class submarines (TRIUMPH and TORBAY) in late 1993. It may be relevant to note that HMS VANGUARD commissioned in August 1993, so it is possible that this operation may have been linked to her sea trials and possible first deployment to protect her from other ‘interested parties’.

Overall this list shows just how busy the RN submarine force has been in the late Cold War, and the levels of commitment involved. It is a timely reminder of how much is asked of Submariners and the risks they take on a daily basis — it is perhaps fitting that we will never know what they did in any detail, only that this most silent of services had a very loud and busy Cold War.

YEAR

SUBMARINE OPERATION

OTHER OPERATIONS

1980

HMS CONQUEROR: OP SWAIN (nfd)

1981

HMS CONQUEROR: OP BOMBA (nfd)

1982

HMS ODIN: OP VINEGAR (Not intelligence related)

HMS OLYMPUS: OP RUMOUR

HMS ONSLAUGHT: Mission 208, Mission 209

HMS ONYX: OP SWELL

HMS CHURCHILL: Nov 82 — Mar 83: South Atlantic Patrol

HMS COURAGEOUS: Falklands Patrol

HMS SUPERB: OP SARDIUS, Mission E79 (SIGINT mission?)

OP MIDFIELD (Patrol Report 931)

1983

HMS ONSLAUGHT: Patrol Report

HMS ORPHEOUS: South Atlantic deployment for intelligence collection

HMS OSIRIS: South Atlantic deployment for intelligence collection

HMS OTUS: OP KERN

HMS VALIANT: South Atlantic Patrol (Intelligence gathering off Argentina)

HMS WARSPITE: South Atlantic Patrol

HMS COURAGEOUS: South Atlantic Patrol, Med Patrol (intelligence gathering)

1984

HMS OBERON: OP PARAGE (Possibly not intelligence), MISSION A211

HMS ORACLE: OP WIDE

HMS OSIRIS: OP JOINT (Not intelligence), South Atlantic Patrols x3 for intelligence collection

HMS SPECTRE: OP MALAISE, Mission E89, E94 (both likely intelligence missions)

HMS SPARTAN: OP WIDE

HMS SPLENDID: Mission E92

OP IMPEACH

1985

HMS ORACLE: OP JOKESMITH

HMS CHURCHILL: Med patrol

HMS SPARTAN: OP PILAU (Int mission, but linked to ASW activity, Intelligence mission — JOINT ACOUSTIC AND ASW CENTRE mission report raised)

HMS TURBULENT: OP TORSION (nfd)

OP WIDE

OP RETAMA

OP SCHUENBERG

1986

HMS OBERON: OP FULMIN, OP EXPLORE (Baltic Sea)

HMS ONSLAUGHT: South Atlantic Patrol

HMS ONYX: OP FIG

HMS OPPOSSUM: OP GRENADE (GIUK Gap)

HMS ORPHEOUS: South Atlantic Deployment

HMS SWIFTSURE: OP MASCLE A211 (Norwegian and Greenland Seas patrol), Pacific Ocean deployment, South Atlantic Deployment

HMS SOVEREIGN: Mission E108, E11 (Barents Sea intelligence collection)

HMS SUPERB: Mission B20, Norwegian and Greenland Sea (likely intelligence gathering mission)

HMS SPLENDID: OP WILFRED, Surveillance operations in Med

HMS TRAFALGAR: OP IMPLEMENT, OP THIN (Norwegian Sea)

HMS TURBULENT: Mission B21 Surveillance Mission Norwegian & Greenland Seas

HMS TIRELESS: OP HORNIE

OP TEMPLATE

OP LOGICIAN

OP ONTOGONEY

1987

HMS ONYX: OP PROFANTITY

HMS OPPORTUNE: OP SIBSTON, OP ABANDON

HMS ORPHEOUS: OP YAP (GIUK operations, linked to DIS), OP SIMBA, OP COSMOLOGY (anti Soviet operation)

HMS WARSPITE: OP CLEM, OP FOUR SCORE, deployment to Med

HMS CHURCHILL: OP IMPERIOUS, OP FOXBAT

HMS CONQUEROR: OP BIGLY

HMS SWIFTSURE: OP TAZZA, OP NULL, OP EXPEND

HMS TRAFALGAR: OP DEMIJOHN

HMS TURBULENT: OP SPEEDWAY

HMS TORBAY: OP CESTRIAN

OP SALIVA

1988

HMS ODIN: Med deployment

HMS OLYMPUS: OP RABELAIS

HMS ONYX: OP HEALD

HMS OPPORTUNE: OP VORTREKKER

HMS OSIRIS: OP INVESTON, South Atlantic Deployment for intelligence collection.

HMS OTTER: OP PROSELYTE

HMS CHURCHILL: OP THUNDERSTROKE (Intelligence mission — JOINT ACOUSTIC AND ASW CENTRE mission report raised)

HMS CONQUEROR: HMS ACCRETION

HMS SWIFTSURE: OP UNGUENT (Possible ASW patrol vs Soviets)

HMS SOVEREIGN: North Norwegian Sea patrol

HMS SPECTRE: OP NECKED

HMS TRAFALGAR: OP AMARENT, OP MATE (not intelligence related?)

HMS TORBAY: OP REGICIDE

OP LANGLEY

OP CHOCTAW

OP WINCE

1989

1990

HMS TRENCHANT: OP JUDAS

OP PERQUISITE

OP HOLDREDGE

OP LANA

OP DESTINATION

OP TRELLIS

OP VAUGHAN

OP SEARCHLIGHT

1991

HMS SOVEREIGN: OP HINTERLAND (Intelligence mission — JOINT ACOUSTIC AND ASW CENTRE mission report raised)

HMS TRAFALGAR: OP HUTCH OP ZINCALO (Intelligence mission — JOINT ACOUSTIC AND ASW CENTRE mission report raised)

HMS TURBULENT: OP DISSECTION (Intelligence mission — JOINT ACOUSTIC AND ASW CENTRE mission report raised)

OP QUESTOR

OP HECKLER

OP VIRGIL

1992

HMS SUPERB: OP BOY

1993

HMS OPPORTUNE: OP FIDDES, OP CALYPTRA

HMS SUPERB: OP VAIN

HMS TURBULENT: OP DACHS

HMS TIRELESS: OP DOGROSE, OP CHAPPARAL

HMS TORBAY: OP IOWA, OP CHAPMAN

HMS TALENT: OP SHARP GUARD, OP CLICHÉ (Likely Med related), Mission T32033

HMS TRIUMPH: OP RAGWORM, OP REMEMBER (PART 1 & 2), OP IOWA

OP GAGGER / HAROLD

1994

HMS UNICORN: OP RELIEVE

HMS VALIANT: OP OINTMENT

HMS SPLENDID: OP YAM

HMS TIRELESS: OP SHARP GUARD

HMS TORBAY: OP NASEBY, OP ABBERLEY, OP SABBATICAL/SPARROW MARSH (nfd), OP CHAMPMAN (conducted for Defence Research Agency),

HMS TURBULENT: OP CARDAMON, OP HARGRAVE, OP ACCENTRIC

OP MARGUERITE

OP VAIN

Submarine

MOD Operations

DI Naval Collection Operations

Patrol Locations If Known

OBERON

Op PARAGE (Oct 1984) DEFE69/1362

Op FULMIN (Oct 1986) DEFE 69/1494

(Also known as ‘mission 215’ — likely intelligence collection for DIS)

Mission A211 (Oct 1984) — DEFE 31/287 (Likely linked to OP PARAGE)

Op EXPLORE (July 1986) — DEFE 69/1465

(Conducted in Baltic Sea)

ODIN

Op VINEGAR (Mar 1–31 1982) — DEFE 69/1224

Mediterranean (June 1988)

DEFE 69/1584

OLYMPUS

Op RUMOUR (Feb 1982) — DEFE 69/1225

Op RABELAIS (Nov 1988) DEFE 69/1635

ONSLAUGHT

Mission 208 (Jun 23 1982) — DEFE 69/1508

Mission 209 –( Sep 17 1982) — DEFE 69/1507

Patrol Report (May 01–31 1983) DEFE 69/1297 (DI Tasking)

South Atlantic (May — June 1986) — DEFE 69/1468

ONYX

Op SWELL (Mar 1–31 1982) — DEFE 69/1219

Op FIG (Aug 8–26 1986) — DEFE 69/1436

Op PROFANITY (Jun 1987) DEFE 69/1535

Op HEALD (Mar 30 1988) — DEFE 69/1639

OPPORTUNE

Op SIBTON (10 Mar 1987) — DEFE 69/1526

Op ABANDON (4 May 1987) — DEFE 69/1774

Op VORTREKKER (Aug 3 1988) — DEFE 69/1640

OP FIDDES (‘Hazan Supplement) –(20 May 1993 DEFE 69/1958

Op CALYPTRA (Apr 5 — May 20 1993) DEFE 69/1975

OPPOSSUM

Op GRENADE (Apr 24 1986) — DEFE 69/1442

Conducted in ‘Iceland/Faroes gap’

ORACLE

Op WIDE (Sep 1984) — DEFE 69/1360 -ASW report raised

Op JOKESMITH (Jan — Dec 1985) DEFE 69/1416 (Fleet op analysis report raised)

ORPHEOUS

Op YAP (Apr 14–29 1987) DEFE 69/1464 (conducted in ‘Greenland-Iceland-Faroes Gap’)

Op SIMBA (Jun 17, 1987) DEFE 69/1528

Op COSMOLOGY (Jul 21, 1987) DEFE 69/1536 (possible anti-Soviet mission)

South Atlantic Patrol (Nov — Dec 1983) — Likely conducted in part for Defence Intelligence.

(DEFE 69/1272 & 1273)

Med Patrol (conducted for Defence Intelligence Staff) 03 Nov — 03 Dec 1986

(DEFE 69/1471)

OSIRIS

Op JOINT (01–31 Jul 1984) — No file references to intelligence collection mission.

Op INVESTON (11 Dec 1988) DEFE 69/1642

Deployment Diary (25 Jan — Mar 16, 1983) DEFE 31/262

Deployments to Falkland Islands Jan — Mar 1983 (DEFE 31/262 refers — Will have been intelligence mission as tasked by DI)

‘First South Atlantic Patrol’ (Nov 1–30 1984) — DEFE 69/1253

‘Second South Atlantic Patrol’ (Dec 1–31 1984) DEFE 69/1254 — Possible Intelligence role

‘Third South Atlantic Patrol’ (Jan — Dec 1984) — DEFE 69/1255

South Atlantic Patrol (May 30 1988)DEFE 69/1583 — possible intelligence collection linked to file reference 226

OTTER

Op PROSELYTE (Oct 4 1988) — DEFE 69/1636

OTUS

Op KERN (Jan — Aug 1983) — DEFE 69/1636

UNICORN

Op RELIEVE (Aug 28 — Sep 15 1994 DEFE 69/1966)

VALIANT

OP RUTLAND & OP BRIDGEPORT (1968) — DEFE 26/2 — likely SIGINT mission based on file title

OP TRICKY (May 1 — Jun 30 1985)- DEFE 31/212

Op OINTMENT (Mar 11 — May 9 1994) — DEFE 69/1973

South Atlantic Patrol (May — Jun 1984) — DEFE 69/1256

Unclear — Oct 1983 (Proceedings doc remains classified) — DEFE 69/1299

WARSPITE

Op CLEM (Apr 02 1987) — DEFE 69/1469 (Fleet OA Staff report)

Op FOUR SCORE (Apr 10 1987) — DEFE 69/1530

Patrol in Med (Sep — Nov 1987) DIS File

DEFE 69/1524

CHURCHILL

Op IMPERIOUS (Jan 1987) — DEFE 69/1529

Op FOXBAT (Aug 2 1988) — DEFE 69/1563

Op THUNDERSTROKE (Nov 4 1988) — DEFE 69/1641

Patrol in South Atlantic (Nov 82 — Mar 83) — DEFE 69/1252

Patrol in Med — 1985 (DIS file) — DEFE 69/1414, DEFE 69/1538, DEFE 69/1534

CONQUEROR

Op PULP (Jul 01–31 1979)

Op SWAIN (Dec 03, 1980) DEFE 69/1522

Op BOMBA (Jul 01–31 1981) DEFE 69/1300

Op AMELCORN (Oct 01–31 1981) DEFE 69/1114

Op ACCRETION (Dec 13, 1988) — DEFE 69/1566

Op BIGLY (May 6 1987) DEFE 69/1533

Op ACCRETION (Apr 1988) DEFE 69/1644

COURAGEOUS

Falkland Islands (Nov — Dec 82) — DEFE 69/1257 — Likely Intg Gathering as ‘231’ file

Falkland Islands Third Patrol (1983) DEFE 69/1160

Med Patrol (Oct 1983)

“Intelligence Gathering in the Med” (Sep 1983)- DEFE 24/3017

SWIFTSURE

N/A

OP MASCLE ‘Mission B16’ (Apr 24, 1986) DEFE 69/1470

‘Mission FP 086 Pacific Ocean’ — (Jul 25 — Sep 8, 1986) — DEFE 69/1466

Op TAZZA (Feb 18, 1987) DEFE 69/1527 (Op Staff report)

Op NULL (Dec 14, 1987) DEFE 69/1539

Op EXPEND (Dec 15, 1987) DEFE 69/1525

Op UNGUENT (Nov 3, 1988) DEFE 69/1645 (ASW Report raise acoustics)

Norwegian and Greenland Seas (Op MASCLE) (Jan 7–1986)

(DI Mission — DI8 Likely in pursuit of Soviet ASW tactics)

South Atlantic Patrol (May 1986) — DEFE 69/1473

SOVEREIGN

Mission E108 (Mar 11 1986) — DEFE 69/1451 (likely intelligence gathering)

Op HINTERLAND (Sep 12 1991) — DEFE 69/1884

Mission E111, Barents Sea (July 8–10 1986) DEFE 69/1467

Operations in North Norwegian Sea (Dec 01–31 1988) — DEFE 31/267 (original DINC file)

SUPERB

Op SARDIUS (01–30 Apr 1982) — DEFE 69/1221

Mission E79 (Oct 01 — Dec 31 1982) — DEFE 69/1286 (Likely intelligence gathering)

Op BOY (Dec 15 1992 — Jan 15 1993) DEFE 69/1962

Op VAIN (Apr 27 — June 02 1994) DEFE 69/1895, DEFE 69/1964

Mission B20, Norwegian and Greenland Seas, (Aug 5 1986) DEFE 69/1445 (Intelligence Mission)

SPECTRE

OP MALAISE (01 Apr — 30 Apr 1984)

DEFE 69/1358

OP NECKED (Mar & Dec 13 1988) — DEFE 69/1565, DEFE 69/1637

Mission E89 (Jan 01–31 1984) — DEFE 31/288

Mission E94 (Aug 01–31 1984) — DEFE 31/285

SPARTAN

OP WIDE (Nov 01–30 1984) — DEFE 69/1359

Op PILAU (Jan 01–31 1985) (ASW raised)

SPLENDID

Mission E92 (Jun 01–30 1984) — DEFE 31/286

Op WILFRED (Oct 16 1986) DEFE 69/1521 (Fleet analysis staff report)

Op YAM (Sep 15 1994)

‘Surveillance Operation in the Med’ (Jan 7 1986) DEFE 69/1443

TRAFALGAR

Op MATE (Feb 22 1988) DEFE 69/1562

Op IMPLEMENT (May 8 1986) — DEFE 69/1474

Op THIN (Oct 7 1986) — DEFE 69/1441

(Norwegian Sea)

Op DEMIJOHN (Oct 9 1987) DEFE 69/1531

Op AMARENT (Apr 16 1988) DEFE 69/1638

Op ZINCALO (Aug 05 1991) DEFE 69/1883

Op KUTCH (Aug 6 1991) — DEFE 69/1881

TURBULENT

Op TORSION (Jan 01 — Dec 31 1985) (fleet analysis report)

Op SPEEDWAY (Dec 14 1987) DEFE 69/1537

Op DISSECTION (Jul 18 1991) DEFE 69/1878

OP DACHS (Mar 01–16 1993) DEFE 69/1974

Mission B21 Surveillance Mission Norwegian & Greenland Seas (Oct 30 1986) DEFE 69/1444

TIRELESS

Op HORNIE (Jun 25 1986) DEFE 69/1472

Op DOGROSE (Jan 25 1993) DEFE 69/1894

OP CHAPPARAL (Apr 19 1993) DEFE 69/1887

Op SHARP GUARD (Nov 2 1994 — Mar 30 1995) DEFE 69/1980

TORBAY

OP SABBATICAL / SPARROWMARSH (Feb 20–21 1994) DEFE 69/1963

OP CHAMPMAN (30 Aug 1994) DEFE 69/1967 (Defence Research Agency op)

OP CESTRIAN (Oct 22 1987)

OP REGICIDE (Dec 5 1988) DEFE 69/1643

OP IOWA (Dec 10 1993) DEFE 69/1959

OP CHAPMAN (Mar 23 1993) DEFE 69/2042

OP NASEBY (Aug 12 -21 1994) DEFE 69/1976

OP ABERLEY (Aug 26 -31 1994) DEFE 69/1977

TRENCHANT

OP JUDAS (Oct 4 1990) DEFE 69/1885

Op CARDAMON, HARGRAVE, ACCENTRIC (Jun 1994) DEFE 69/2043

TALENT

OP SHARP GUARD (Feb 28 — Mar 23 1993) DEFE 69/1965

OP CLICHÉ (Apr 28 — May 11 1993) DEFE 69/1978 (Possible Med mission?)

Mission T32033 (Nov 18 -23 1993) DEFE 69/1979

Patrol Report Feb 1993 — DEFE 69/1957 (DIS Related)

TRIUMPH

OP RAGWORM (May 23 — Aug 25 1993) DEFE 69/1968, 1969, 1970

OP REMEMBER (Phase 1 & 2) Jul 26 — Aug 23 1993) — DEFE 69/1971 — DEFE 69/1972

OP IOWA (Dec 10 1993) DEFE 69/1960